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A COST-BENEFIT APPROACH 
TO DRINKING WATER AND CANCER 
Talbot Page and Robert Harris 
ABSTRACT 
The problem of controlling carcinogens in drinking water is 
one of decision-making under uncertainty. Although much information 
has been gained in the last eight years, pervasive uncertainties 
remain. The paper identifies some of the trends in the 
accumulation of the evidence, and attempts to evaluate the currently 
existing uncertainty. 
INTRODUCTION 
A COST-BENEF IT APPROACH 
TO DRINKING WATER AND CANCER 
Talbot Page 
California Institute of Technology 
Robert Harris 
Clement Associates, Inc. 
Washington, DC 
This paper reports a cost-benefit analysis of the control 
of carcinogens in drinking water. (For a previous discussion, 
see References fl] and 12].) We focus on the use of cost-benefit 
analysis in dealing with uncertainty. We suspect that, to many 
scientists at this conference, a cost-benefit approach to drinking 
water and cancer may seem infeasible, unethical, or both. In fact, 
we agree that there are important ethical and practical problems 
in the application of cost-benefit analysis to the health and 
safety area. Having considered these problems elsewhere {3], we 
nonetheless believe that a cost-benefit approach offers a useful 
perspective to the problem of chemicals in drinking water. 
Our approach differs from that commonly taken by epidemiologists 
or toxicologists; we attempt to highlight this difference as it 
relates to the analysis of uncertainty. The difference arises 
primarily from viewing the problem of chemicals in drinking water 
as a decision problem, where choices have to be made about the 
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amount of precautionary control, rather than as a science problem, 
where knowledge is sought for its own sake. We consider uncertainty 
under three headings: location of the decision problem, risk 
assessment, and evaluation of uncertainty. 
LOCATION OF THE PROBLEM 
To many critics of cost-benefit analysis, a central problem 
is the difficulty in placing a value on life; to an epidemiologist 
or toxicologist, a central problem is establishing a causal link 
between chemicals in drinking water and increased cancer rates. 
To a practitioner of cost-benefit analysis, neither strikes at the 
heart of the problem. In studying this problem, one finds enormous 
uncertainties associated with many of the critical decision 
factors. These uncertainties can be interpreted in alternative 
ways. Although opportunities exist for reducing the uncertainties, 
these opportunities are costly and of ten involve substantial 
tinle delays. Potential irreversible costs, such as latent 
cancers, may :result from the time delays. To a practitioner of 
cost-benefit analysis, the heart of the problem is the value of 
iniormation--the costs and benefits of acquiring new imformation 
and interpreting existing information. 
The cost-benefit approach is to look for gaps in information. 
Where the cost of reducing a gap is small compared with the expected 
gain in improved decision making, research attention and analytical 
skill should be focused. Application of this principle locates 
the heart of the problem, not on the proof of causality or on the 
valuation of life but on the risk assessment. To place the 
value-of-life issue in a framework of uncertainty, we can say 
that uncertainty exists about what ethical basis should be used 
in deciding when to initiate a life-saving program or when to 
cut it off. 
However, upper and lower limits are fairly well agreed upon, 
and these limits imply a relatively small range in the value of 
a life compared with other uncertainties associated with drinking 
water and cancer. Defining the lower limit is the notion of 
productivity. Even the most callous persons tend to agree that 
it is worthwhile to pay as much to keep a worker alive as his 
contribution to the economy's productivity. "Human capital" 
theories set this minimal value at somewhere around $200,000 
per average worker (most human capital theorists are willing 
to use this figure to include the retired or otherwise nonworking). 
Defining the upper limit is the notion of feasibility. Even the 
most compassionate do not advocate spending the nation's entire 
resources on health and safety. Estimates of economic feasibility 
vary, but they are seldom more than $2 million per life saved 
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when stated explicitly. For limited programs and specially 
identified individuals (e. g. , those on kidney machines), the amount 
is sometimes more; but for large programs, much more is generally 
considered economically infeasible, although desirable. (Economists 
generally prefer the willingness-to-pay approach, on ethical grounds, 
to either of these extremes. This approach leads to a value of 
life on the order of $200,000 to $500,000. ) 
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The important thing to note is that little more than a single 
order of magnitude exists between the upper and lower limits arising 
from productivity and feasibility bases in valuing life. Moreover, 
the area of strongest consensus is probably well within this range. 
By strenuous ethical debate, one might possibly narrow the consensus 
and strengthen conviction, but clearly the ranges of uncertainty in 
other aspects of the problem are much larger. Pike [4] discusses 
reasons why cancer risk estimates from extrapolation models may 
be two or more orders of magnitude in error. K.raybill [5] and 
Crump and Guess [6] discuss sources for similar magnitudes of 
error in epidemiologic studies. Not only are the ranges of uncertainty 
larger, but also the opportunities for narrowing the ranges are 
greater. Thus, by the value-of-information principle, risk assessment 
is a more pivotal part of the drinking water problem, for decision 
purposes, than further clarifying issues concerning the value 
of life. In other words, an epidemiologic study that convincingly 
shows that chemicals in drinking water raises the cancer rate 
by 10% contributes more to decision making than a convincing 
argument that shows that the ethical base of a willingness-to-pay 
approach is better than the human capital approach. 
The value-of-information principle also suggests that proving 
causality is less important than other aspects of risk assessment. 
To see this, we again put the matter into a framework of uncertainty 
ranges. The mere fact that known carcinogens exist in drinking 
water strongly suggests that there is a causal link between drinking 
water and cancer. However, this fact does not "prove" causality 
under the criteria described by Hill [7] and discussed for the 
case of drinking water by Crump and Guess [6]. To establish 
causality under Hill's criteria would require expensive and time­
consuming investigation (where one of the principal costs of delay 
is the expected cost of preventable cancers if drinking water 
is carcinogenic). 
Given the evidence that existed, say by 1977, we believe 
that a reasonable person would be justified in assigning a 90% 
probability that chemicals in drinking water contribute to cancer. 
The cost-benefit practitioner must ask: how much is it worth 
to amass more evidence so that this 90% will increase to 100%, or 
close to it. (Or if the evidence is negative, to something 
less than 90%. To make use of negative evidence, the tests would 
have to be designed differently than they now are. They would 
have to be designed to estimate "minimum detectable effects" 
at various probability levels. ) In terms of affecting the expected 
value of improved decisions, the additional information is worth 
something. 
Our calculations [2] of expected cancers and the costs of 
control indicate that, if there were a 90% certainty of causality 
and a 90% chance that the drinking water effect were in the ranges 
estimated (along with a 10% chance of no effect at all), then 
there would be a net benefit associated with installing granular 
activated carbon (GAC) filters for large cities with high levels 
of organics. With 100% certainty of a drinking water effect in 
the ranges estimated, our calculations indicate net benefits in 
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GAC filtration for additional cities. But this difference, 
arising from a narrowing of uncertainty as to whether there is 
a drinking water effect at all, is not nearly so striking as 
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the difference to be obtained from narrowing uncertainty associated 
with estimates of likely numbers of excess cancers associated 
with particular levels of exposure, or narrowing the range of 
uncertainty about exposure itself. These latter ranges of 
uncertainty span orders of magnitude. 
The comparison reveals a fundamental difference in approach 
between science and policy. Science is concerned with truth, 
and resolving the last bit of uncertainty as to a causal link 
may be very important. Public policy is concerned with decision 
making and cost--here, the expected cost of preventable cancers 
and the cost of prevention. In cost-benifit terms, resolving the 
last bit of uncertainty about causality is less important than 
narrowing the range of uncertainty associated with estimates 
of excess mortality. Policy making accepts a standard different 
from science rather than a lower standard. A scientist may wish 
to reduce, as efficiently as possible, uncertainty in ·some narrowly 
focused area; a cost-benefit practitioner wishes to resolve, 
as efficiently as possible, uncertainty over the entire decision 
process. A scientist can suspend judgment while awaiting resolution 
of uncertainty; a decision maker cannot avoid making decisions 
under existing uncertainty. A decision to postpone action, awaiting 
better information, is just as much a decision as one to undertake 
action. 
RISK ASSESSMENT 
From a cost-benefit perspective, the key question is not, 
"Can it be proved beyond a reasonable doubt that chemicals in 
drinking water raise cancer rates?" Instead, the fundamental 
question is "How much evidence is enough to justify a precautionary 
action?" From a cost-benefit perspective, we do not need to 
know whether there is a strong scientific consensus that at 
least a 99.9% probability exists of at least a 0. 0001% increase 
in cancer over background as a result of drinking water. Learning 
whether there is a scientific consensus that at least a 60% 
probability exists of at least a 5% increase associated with 
chemicals in drinking water would be more useful. From a cost­
benefit perspective, we need to concern ourselves with the latter, 
more middle range of uncertainty. Some evidence of hazard-­
highly incomplete--and a range of precautionary actions exists. 
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Some precautionary actions, such as changing the point of chlorination, 
are so inexpensive that little evidence of hazard is needed to 
mandate them. Some, such as GAC, are more expensive and require 
greater weight of evidence to mandate them. What evidence is 
enough? How is it to be interpreted? How do we proceed in such 
cases of uncertainty? A more detailed discussion of these questions 
can be found in our cost-benefit analysis fl,2], with additional 
considerations presented here. 
One useful procedure in situations where considerable uncertainty 
exists about the truth of a theory is to use the theory to make 
predictions. If the prediction is confirmed by later experiment 
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Looking at the weight of evidence as it has accumulated over 
the past 9 years, we would say that the dichotomy between surface 
waters and groundwaters as a predictor of carcinogenic risk appears 
less solid now than then. However, identification of gastrointestinal 
and urinary tract cancers, estimation of the order of magnitude 
of the effect, and identification of the problem of statistical 
power all seem more solidly based. The trend in the accumulation 
of evidence has been to support the theory of a link between 
cancer and organic chemicals in drinking water, particularly 
those produced by the addition of chlorine to water 16]. 
A second useful pr_ocedure, when considerable uncertainty 
exists about a theory (and still considerable uncertainty remains), 
is to look for independent estimates of the same parameter, where 
the independent estimates use different data bases and different 
computations. If there is nothing to the theory, the two estimates 
are not likely, by chance, to be close. For the problem of drinking 
water, we are fortunate to have two independent ways of estimating 
risk. One is epidemiologic. It uses human data on cancer, data 
on direct human exposure to various qualities of drinking water, 
data on occupational exposures, and data on socioeconomic factors. 
The other is rodent bioassay. Here, the data are on doses of 
specific chemicals to rodents and their responses, along with 
measurements of concentrations of these specific chemicals in 
drinking water. The modeling assumptions have to do with the 
additivity of effects of specific chemicals in combination, with 
extrapolation, and with interspecies comparison. Elsewhere Il,2], 
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we discuss the range of error that can be associated with each 
of the two estimation procedures, concluding that each method 
could easily have a range of uncertainty of a couple of orders 
of magnitude. 
In the comparison, the risk estimate produced by the two 
methods are roughly an order of magnitude apart, with the bioassay 
extrapolations lower. The estimates overlap in their ranges of 
resolution, and we view this comparison as strongly suggestive 
evidence in support of the link between cancer and drinking 
water. (For further discussion of this comparison, see Crump and 
Guess 16].) 
A third useful procedure for a risk assessment, where a 
great deal of uncertainty exists, is to provide a range of risk 
estimates and a discussion of why the limits were chosen where 
they were and of the likelihood that the actual risk might fall 
outside the range in either direction. In the Brookings paper IlJ, 
we derive a range of risk estimates, as shown in Table 1. The 
low estimate is based on the experimental animal (mouse) most 
sensitive to chloroform, and the high estimate is based on 
the epidemiologic studies in New York and Louisiana. 
Risk Estimate 
Low 
Medium 
High 
Table 1 
Annual Excess Cancer Deaths 
per Million Populationa 
20 
150 
300 
aThis excess is based on water comparable to Mississippi River water. 
or evidence that was unavailable at the time of the prediction, 
this is taken as evidence in support of the theory itself. 
Causality is not established this way, but confidence in the theory 
is increased. In our 1974 study IS], we made several predictions. 
Looking back to see how well later evidence supports or denies 
these predictions, we make four observations: 
1. We identified the drinking water effect principally 
with gastrointestinal and urinary tract cancers, At the time of 
our study, we could find no existing studies associating these 
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or other sites with carcinogens in drinking water; the identification 
of gastrointestinal and urinary tract cancers came entirely from 
the regression analysis itself. This association has been 
well supported by later studies I6], which strongly suggest that 
chlorination of drinking water increases the risk of rectal cancer 
and, to a lesser extent, colon and bladder cancer. 
2. We interpreted our regression coefficients to provide 
a rough estimate of the magnitude of a possible drinking water 
effect. The·l974 calculation of effect was a 10 to 15% excess 
in total cancer mortality over background rates. At the time, 
we considered this finding more tentative than finding 1, above, 
because of the statistical problems; nonetheless, this estimate 
is rather consistent with estimates from different data bases 
in later studies. 
3. An obvious implication of finding 2 was that problems 
of statistical power (problems of false negatives) would exist. 
This conclusion arises from the estimated low risk factor (10 to 15%), 
in contrast to risk factors of 3 or more, typically encountered 
in epidemiological studies. With a relatively small drinking 
water effect, patterns of results are likely to have an overlay 
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of random "noise." Problems of low statistical power have occurred 
in following studies, and these problems have made confirming 
or refuting the link between cancer and drinking water difficult. 
Although these problems were forecast in the original 1974 study, 
they have received little attention. For example, few studies 
calculate probabilities of false negatives and minimum detectable effects. 
For some discussion of the problem of false negatives, see Crump 
and Guess I6J and Harris et al. I9J 
4. We postulated that the dichotomy between surface and 
groundwater would be a good surrogate for differences in organics 
in drinking water in Louisiana. This was based on work by Laseter [10], 
indicating that organics were 1,000-fold greater in concentration 
in the Mississippi River than in groundwater, and the fact that 
what then was considered a large number of organics of suspected 
toxicity had been identified for the Mississippi River. Since 
1974, research has shown that groundwater is sometimes far more 
contaminated than surface water, and methods of 'directly measuring 
trihalomethanes and other organics have become available. Contamination 
of groundwater was probably less of a problem in the years of 
exposure relevant to the study (exposure from about 1930 to 1960, 
leading to cancers from 1950 to 1969), and for Louisiana the 
dichotomy still appears to be a good indicator of the degree of 
chlorination. 
EVALUATION OF UNCERTAINTY PROFILES 
A naive view of cost-benefit analysis would provide for a 
single, point estimate of the excess risk of cancer from drinking 
water. This estimate could then be compared with an estimate of 
12 
the cost of control and matched with (either implicitly or explicitly) 
a value of life, and a net benefit could be calculated by simple 
algebra. To do so treats the risk estimate as though no uncertainty 
were attached to it, thus ignoring the value-of-information 
principle that is the heart of a cost-benefit approach. 
It makes a difference where the major uncertainties lie 
in a decision problem and what the structure of risk looks like. 
People have preferences about the characteristics of risk they 
accept or reject, and one tenet of the cost-benefit approach 
is that governments should reflect these preferences. 
For example, most people are risk-averse toward certain types 
of risks. The classic illustration of risk aversion is the 
St. Petersburg paradox. The paradox is illustrated by a simple 
lottery. A fair coin will be flipped until the first head. 
The coin will, sooner or later, come up heads. Write n as the 
number of flips before the first head. You will be paid 2n + 1 
dollars. The question is how much are you willing to pay for the 
opportunity to play the lottery. (Before reading on, decide what 
your own willingness to pay is for this risk. ) Note that the 
expected value of the lottery is infinite \ (1/2) (2) + (1/4) (4) + 
<1/8) (8) + . . .  \. 
Many studies of willingness to pay for this lottery have 
been conducted: most people are willing to pay from $5 to $30. 
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The important and obvious point is that this amount differs strikingly 
from the amount a risk-neutral, expected-value-maximizing gambler 
would be willing to pay (which is his whole income, or any finite 
amount). The St. Petersburg paradox is only a paradox if you 
believe that people are not risk-averse. A naive cost-benefit 
analysis, which takes a "best" estimate of risk and uses it as 
a single, point estimate (as though no uncertainty were attached 
to it) in totaling up costs and benefits, is completely ignoring 
risk aversion. 
In some situations assuming that people are not risk-averse 
appears reasonable, but these situations do not apply in the case 
of cancer and drinking water for two reasons: 
1. People may be risk-averse when they are dealing with 
many small risks so that losses and gains can be averaged out 
to approach expected values. In the case of drinking water, we 
are dealing with a unique risk, uncertainty as to the state of 
a fact--the actual hazard associated with cancer and drinking 
water, augmented by other hazards such as teratogenicity, with 
which even greater uncertainty is associated. The stakes associated 
with this unique risk are quite large. 
2. If the potential loss is small and the potential gain is 
large, people may actually be risk-preferring. For example, 
gamblers regularly pay more than the expected value of a gamble 
for the privilege of taking the risk. However, the situation 
is the reverse for the problem of drinking water and cancer. 
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Here, if society decides to accept risk, the potential gain 
is the $5 or so each individual saves per year by not contributing 
to the cost of GAC or other precautionary measures and the potential 
loss is cancer or other genotoxic disease. In such cases assuming 
that no risk aversion exists would be a mistake. 
There is evidence that our concern for risk aversion should 
be strengthened when there is less certainty about the probability 
estimates themselves. In the case of drinking water, the evidence 
is sufficient so that many scientists would attribute at least 
a 60% probability to there being a 5% or greater drinking water 
effect (5% or more of the total cancer mortality rate attributable 
to contaminated drinking water). But this 60% is itself uncertain. 
Scientists will disagree about it, and new information is likely 
to lead to its revision. The less solid our information, the 
more fluid our judgment about the probability. 
Ellsberg [11] illustrated this source of risk aversion by the 
following example. You know that one urn holds 50 red and 50 black 
balls, 100 balls altogether. If you draw a red ball, you get $100. 
A second urn also has 100 balls, which may be red or black. But you have 
no information as to the proportion of red. Again, if you draw 
a red, you get $100. Which gamble would you prefer? If you are 
a risk-neutral, expected-value-maximizer, you might assign a 
"white prior" corresponding to no information, to the second urn, 
and hence, a probability of red e qual to 0.5. In this case, you 
would be indifferent between the two gambles, each having the 
same expected value, $50. However, a real difference exists 
between the two gambles. Additional information from sampling 
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the urns will affect your judgment of the probability in the second 
case but not the first, where this information is perfect already 
(by definition). For example, if you were allowed to draw a 
sample of five balls from each urn, your judgment of the probability 
of red could be altered for the second urn but not for the first. 
The probability of red is ambiguous in the second case, but not 
in the first. Also, most people (about 70%) prefer the first 
gamble to the second, and only about 20% consider the gambles 
the same. 
Clearly, a great deal of ambiguity is associated with judgments 
about the probability of drinking water effects of various magnitudes 
(e.g., the assignment of a 60% probability of a 5% or greater 
excess cancer attributable to contaminated drinking water). 
The more ambiguity, the more reason for this second form of risk 
aversion. The implication of risk aversion of either form is 
to undertake a greater degree of precautionary action than would 
be indicated by calculations from expected values and point 
estimates alone. 
CONCLUSION 
In the past few years concern has increased over protecting 
the public against "over-regulation," and as a means of protection, 
it is increasingly suggested that formal cost-benefit analysis 
be required on proposed regulations before promulgation. Others, 
particularly those concerned with protecting the public health, 
view cost-benefit analysis as a means of attacking regulations 
in general, by increasing delays and the cost of administration. 
Lest cost-benefit analysis become no more than a polemicist's 
weapon, note that a cost-benefit approach can be applied to cost­
benefit analysis itself, as we have emphasized in this paper. 
Cost-benefit analysis is subject to diminishing returns; it should 
not be open-ended and endless. Some information is not worth 
obtaining; it costs too much in terms of its expected benefits. 
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A cost-benefit approach strongly suggests that proving definitely 
that risk exists before taking precautionary action is not worthwhile. 
Over-regulation is a regulatory false positive; under-regulation 
a regulatory false negative. A balanced cost-benefit approach 
does not single out over-regulation to the neglect of the possibility 
of under-regulation. It attempts to estimate the potential 
costs of each kind of mistake and the probabilities of each. 
It then attempts to minimize the expected cost of regulatory 
mistakes of either type. Applying this approach to the problem 
of drinking water demonstrates that much more attention has been 
directed to analysis or statistical significance (probability 
of false positive) than to analysis of statistical power (probability 
of false negative). If, as appears likely, the cost of a false 
negative (preventable but unprevented cancers) is higher than 
the cost of a false positive (unnecessary p�ecautionary treatment), 
then uncertainty associated with the probability of a false negative 
is more pivotal than uncertainty associated with the probability 
of a false positive. This, in turn, means that more attention 
should be focused on questions of statistical power and the 
minimum detectable effects. 
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A balanced cost-benefit analysis takes into account uncertainties 
leading to probabilities of both false positives and false negatives, 
and it carries its analysis of uncertainty throughout the whole 
analysis. This means not relying on single, point estimates 
and treating them as though they were certain. In attempting 
to weigh the uncertainties, observing how later evidence confirms 
or refutes earlier predictions and comparing independent sources 
of evidence for consistency checks are useful. Characterizing 
the profile of uncertainty for the case of drinking water suggests 
that some degree of risk aversion is appropriate. This means 
one should take precautionary actions greater than would be implied 
by straight, expected net benefit maximization alone. We estimated 
net benefits 12], without risk aversion, finding that GAG treatment 
is warranted for some cities. This conclusion is strengthened 
once the profile of uncertainty is taken into consideration. 
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